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MA:MIT Press, 2011, 272 pp., $36.00 (hardback). isbn 978-0-262-01557-9.
1 Introduction
he Language ofhought (LOT) is closely associated with the work of Jerry Fodor.
He defended the idea in his book,he Language ofhought (1975), and continued to
do so,with relativelyminor revisions, throughout his career. Susan Schneider’s book
does not aim to be an exegesis or defence of Fodor. Instead, it oòers an alternative to
Fodor’s version of LOT that she says is an improvement and a worthy replacement.
Her aim is to overcome three challenges that faced his approach.
According to both Fodor and Schneider, LOT’s goal is to explain human thought
in naturalistic, mechanical terms. Schneider deûnes LOT as a package of three
claims to this end. First, having a thought involves tokening ‘symbols’ in your head
and combining those symbols into well-formed symbolic expressions according to
language-like grammatical and semantic rules. Second, thinking is a computational
process involving LOT symbols and symbolic expressions. hird, the semantic value
of an LOT symbol is determined by it standing in a naturalistic causal or nomic
‘locking’ relation to entities in the world.
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Schneider says that Fodor’s version of LOT faces three challenges:
1. Central reasoning is not a computational process
2. he notion of a LOT symbol is unclear
3. LOT is unable to handle Frege cases
In this review, Iwill describe the three challenges and Schneider’s proposed solution.
Aswill become clear, I don’t entirely agreewith everything Schneider says. Especially
with respect to her answer to (2), I think that her version of LOT incurs costs that
should lead us to question it. But notwithstanding this,my overall impression of
her book is a positive one. his book will undoubtedly set the agenda for future
work on LOT. It places the oen-ignored problem of the nature of LOT symbols at
the centre of the LOT debate and it shows how solutions to this problem reach out
and touch many other aspects of the theory. he quality of scholarship and writing
is high throughout. Unusually for a philosophymonograph, it is also fun to read.
2 Central reasoning is not computational
Fodor famously argued against LOT as a theory of central reasoning. Fodor deûned
central reasoning as non-demonstrative reasoning that is sensitive to all (or nearly
all) of one’s beliefs. Central reasoning is meant to cover processes such as how we
revise our beliefs in light of evidence, how wemake inductive inferences, and how
we construct practical plans to achieve our goals. According to Fodor, two problems
stop LOT from being able to account for central reasoning: the globality problem
and the relevance problem. (hese are sometimes misleadingly called the ‘frame
problem’; see Shanahan (1997) for a description of the real frame problem.)
First, the globality problem. Fodor said that certain properties of individual repres-
entations – their simplicity, centrality, and conservativeness – are ‘global’ in the sense
that these properties vary with context; they are not intrinsic to the representations
of which they are predicated. Sometimes adding a certain belief to one’s belief set
will complicate a plan; sometimes it will simplify it. A belief ’s ‘simplicity’ does not
supervene on that belief ’s intrinsic properties. herefore, it does not supervene on a
belief ’s syntactic properties. Computational processes are sensitive only to syntactic
properties. So, says Fodor, reasoning that requires sensitivity to global properties
cannot be a computational process, and thus falls outside the remit of LOT.
Schneider, in a chapter co-written with Kirk Ludwig, responds that a computer
is not sensitivemerely to the syntax of individual representations. A computer is
also sensitive to syntactic relations between representations: how a representation’s
syntax relates to the syntax of other representations and how these relate to the
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system’s general rules of syntactic processing. he failure of an individual repres-
entation’s simplicity to supervene on the representation’s syntactic properties does
not mean that simplicity cannot be tracked by a computational process. Simplicity
may supervene on (and be computationally tracked by following) syntactic interac-
tions between representations. It is worth noting that Fodor (2000) considered this
possibility too in a view he labels M(CTM). However, he argued that this solution
would run into the relevance problem, shiing attention to the other part of his
argument. (See Samuels (2010) for a helpful reconstruction of Fodor’s argument
here.)
he relevance problem arises because central reasoning has access to a large number
of representations: potentially all of the system’s beliefs, desires, and thoughts. Any
one of these could be relevant to the system’s reasoning in any given case, but usually
only a few are. he human central reasoning system tends to focus on just those
representations that are relevant to the agent’s current goals, plans, and context.
How does it know which representations are relevant without doing an exhaustive,
impracticable search through its entire database? Fodor says we do not know of any
computational process that would solve this problem. (We don’t know of any non-
computational process either, but never mind that.) He says that the diõculty of the
relevance problem explains our failure to produce a computer with artiûcial general
intelligence (AGI). Successful AI systems tend to excel at narrowly deûned tasks
(like playing Go or detecting your face), but they do not show general intelligence:
they are poor at pulling together relevant information from disparate sources to
make plans outside their narrowly deûned area of competence.
Building onwork by Shanahan and Baars (2005) andDehaene and Changeux (2004),
Schneider argues that a solution to the relevance problem can be found within
Global Workspaceheory (GWT). GWT says that multiple ‘specialist’ cognitive
processes compete for access to a global cognitive ‘workspace’. If granted access, the
information a specialist has to oòer is ‘broadcast’ back to other specialists. Access to
the global workspace is controlled by ‘attention-like’ processes. he contents of the
globalworkspaceunfold in a largely serialmanner over time. Schneider identiûes the
serial unfolding with central reasoning, and she argues that the relevance problem
is solved by the ceaseless parallel work of the specialists.
I am not convinced by this solution. GWT describes a functional architecture – and
in the case of its neuronal version, an anatomical architecture – that the brain could
use to share andmanage information. In this respect, GWT pertains to part of the
relevance problem: in order to bring information to bear in central reasoning there
must be channels to share and manage information. But, and it is an important
but, GWT does not say how traõc along those channels is regulated to guarantee
relevance. It does not explain how relevant, and only relevant, information is
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shepherded into the global workspace. Shanahan and Baars don’t attempt to explain
this, and neither does themore neurally orientated GWT work. he answer cannot
be bottom-up pressure from specialists (for there is no reason to think that the
specialist who shouts loudest contains relevant information); it also cannot be top-
down selection by some executive process (for that would introduce the relevance
problem for that executive process). How then does the reasoning system ensure
that relevant, and only relevant, information ûlters into the global workspace?
If the answer is ‘attention’, what mechanism keeps attention aligned to what is
relevant to the system in the current context? Baars and Franklin (2003) describe
interplay between ‘executive functions’, ‘specialist networks’, and ‘attention codelets’
that control access to the global workspace. Unfortunately, how these components
work to track relevance is le largely unspeciûed. A computational solution to the
relevance problem may be compatible with GWT; but GWT, as it currently stands,
is largely silent about how relevance is computed.
What would it take to ûnd a computational solution to the relevance problem?
Fodor linked this to our ability to build a working AGI. Schneider disagrees: she
says this sets the bar too high. I do not think so. Building a working computational
model that can engage in non-trivial non-demonstrative reasoning shows that we
know how to solve the relevance problem; that we really know how to solve it and
not just oøoad the hard parts onto an unexplained part of themodel (for example,
‘executive function’, ‘attention’). Building an artiûcial simulation capable of solving
the relevance problem is the hallmark that a computational solution to the problem
has been found.
Fodor thought that we would never ûnd a solution and he cited a long history of
AGI failures in support. However, past failure is only a guide to the future if the
computational techniques explored so far are representative of those that we will
discover in the future. Fodor’s conûdence in this strikesme as unfounded. Schneider
may overreach when she says that GWT already solves the relevance problem, but
her overall strategy – promoting the opportunities oòered by novel computational
architectures – strikes me as fundamentally correct. here aremore computational
architectures than were dreamt of in Fodor’s philosophy (or than we can dream
of today). GWT is one, but there aremany others. Deep Q-networks, completely
unrelated to GWT, show promising elements of domain-general reasoning. A
single deep Q-network can play forty-nine Atari computer games, oen at super-
human levels, switching strategy depending on the game it plays (Mnih et al., 2015).
Signiûcantly, the network is never told which game it is playing. It works this out
for itself from the pattern of pixels it ‘sees’. he network pulls together, by itself, a
policy relevant for playing the game in hand. his isn’t AGI or a solution to the
relevance problem, but it’s a step in the right direction.
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3 What is a LOT symbol?
LOT explains thought and thinking in terms of LOT symbols, but what is a LOT
symbol? If you look inside someone’s head, you don’t see anything that looks like a
symbol. How then should we understand LOT’s talk of symbols inside the head?
Schneider calls this question the ‘elephant in the room’ for LOT. Fodor did little
to address it; he focused instead on arguing for explanatory and predictive gains
that would ow to psychology from positing LOT symbols, whatever those symbols
happen to be.
If one is puzzled aboutwhat some thing is, a plausible opening gambit is to substitute
the question of what it is with a question about its individuation conditions. his is
Schneider’s strategy. Her question, then, becomes: when are two physical tokens –
in particular, two brain states – of the same LOT symbol type?
Schneider discards two theories of LOT symbol individuation before proposing her
own.
he ûrst theory she discards is a ‘semantic’ theory. A semantic theory of symbols
says that two physical tokens are of the same symbol type just in case they have
the same semantic content. Schneider’s objection is that a semantic theory would
conict with LOT’s ambition to give a reductive, naturalistic theory of semantic
content. LOT is committed to explaining the semantic content of LOT symbols
in terms of naturalistic (causal or informational relations) relations between LOT
symbols and the world. his reductive project won’t work if one of the players in
the reductive base – LOT symbols – themselves depend on semantic content.
he second theory Schneider rejects is an ‘orthographic’ theory. An orthographic
theory says that two physical tokens are of the same symbol type just in case they
have the same ‘shape’. he ink marks on this page can be grouped into symbol types
based on their physical shape. Obviously, ‘shape’ means something diòerent for
LOT symbols than it does for ink marks – you don’t ûnd neurons shaped like the
letter ‘a’. Schneider rejects the orthographic theory because it does not provide an
account of this alternative notion of ‘shape’.
Schneider’s preferred theory individuates symbols by their computational role. Her
theory says that two physical tokens are of the same symbol type just in case they
play the same computational role within the computing system. Schneider deûnes
‘playing the same computational role’ as being physically interchangeable without
aòecting the computation. Two physical tokens play the same computational role
just in case one physical token can be exchanged for the other without aòecting any
(actual or possible) computational transitions of the system. A key source of support
for her view comes from John Haugeland’s account of formal symbol systems like
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chess:
Formal tokens are freely interchangeable if and only if they are the same
type. hus it doesn’t make any diòerence which white pawn goes on
which white-pawn square; but switching a pawn with a rook or a white
pawn with a black one couldmake a lot of diòerence. (Haugeland, 1985,
p. 52)
Furthermore, Schneider argues that physical tokens should be typed by their total
computational role. hat means that any change, no matter how small, to a system’s
(actual or possible) computational transitions resulting from exchanging two of its
physical tokens entails that those tokens are not of the same symbol type.
Iwill not describe the arguments that Schneider gives to support her theory. Instead,
I wish to ag two potential problems.
he ûrst is that her theory (and Haugeland’s) does not appear to work for more
complex computers such as modern electronic PCs. Inside a PC, physical tokens
of the same symbol type vary enormously in their physical nature; they are rarely
freely interchangeable. Conversely, physical tokens of diòerent symbol types can
sometimes be interchanged without aòecting the computation at all. his is because
modern PCs, unlike chess sets, keep track of changes in their physical tokens and
adjust their principles of physical processing accordingly. his strategy is called
‘virtualising’ the physical hardware. It occurs across multiple levels inside a PC (see
Patterson andHennessy, 2011, Ch. 5). For example, suppose that a physical token of
the symbol type ‘dog’ is tokened insidemy PC (maybe as part of an email message).
Imagine that this physical token involves electrical activity in my PC’s physical RAM
locations 132, 2342, and 4562. However, these locations, and this pattern of activity,
are not somehow reserved for ‘dog’ tokens. Nanoseconds later, tokening ‘dog’ may
involve electrical activity in diòerent physical RAM locations, say, 32, 42, and 234.
Now, tokening ‘cat’ may involve electrical activity in the old physical RAM locations
of 132, 2342, and 4562. he physical memory inside my computer is constantly
being ‘remapped’ to optimisemy computer’s performance. In such a context, using
interchangeablity of physical tokens within the computation to individuate symbol
types is hopeless. Tokens that play the same total computational rolemay not be
freely physically interchangeable (‘dog’ now and ‘dog’ aer amemory remap), and
tokens that are freely interchangeable without aòecting the computation may play
diòerent computational roles (‘dog’ now and ‘cat’ aer amemory remap).
What happens inside amodern PC is that physical tokens that fall under the same
symbol type vary but the PC’s physical principles ofmanipulation vary accordingly
to accommodate the change. he PC’s formal principles for manipulating symbol
types (its algorithm) stays constant throughout. (Below, I consider cases in which
6
the algorithm changes too.) Imagine that, during a chess match, the physical board
were cut up into pieces and reorganised aer everymove but the physical principles
governing movement of the chess pieceswere changed to accommodate the reorgan-
isation: black’s king’s rook can nowmove to diòerent squares and it is symbolised
by a horse-shaped ûgure, but it can attack, and be attacked by, the same white pieces
– the overall state of play in the game is unaòected. Only a lunatic would reorganise
their chess board like this during a chess match. But physical remapping is both
adaptive and common in electronic PCs. Onemight expect brains to use similar
virtualising tactics given their beneûts for squeezing optimal performance from
limited computing hardware.
In summary, the ûrst problem is that ‘same total computational role’ does not mean
‘physical interchangeability’, at least for computers that use virtualising strategies.
he second problem is that Schneider’s account does not provide stable symbol
types. She foreshadows this worry when she says that her proposal makes it hard for
symbol types to be shared across diòerent computers. You and I are not disposed to
undergo exactly the same computational transitions when thinking about dogs, so
we do not have the same LOT symbol types. (Maybe you have DOG1 and I have
DOG2.) In a footnote on page 130, Schneider says that similar worries apply to a
single human being over time. She has in mind relatively slow changes in someone’s
computational roles that might occur over a lifetime. However, the diõculty comes
not from slow changes, but from short-term changes produced by learning.
he algorithms run by electronic PCs are normally ûxed, either by their hardware
or by the program they are given. But computers can also modify their algorithms.
Machine learning is now common. Computers like AlphaGo modify their (hugely
complicated) algorithms in many ways in response to learning data (either labelled
examples of ‘good’ behaviour or reward/punishment signals). When learning occurs,
a computer modiûes its algorithm: total computational roles before and aer learn-
ing are diòerent. his creates a problem for Schneider’s account of symbol identity.
She indexes symbol identity to a symbol’s total computational role, but this role
changes during learning. A change, even a small one, to a symbol’s computational
role will ramify. Remember that any change to a computational role, no matter
how minor, changes a symbol’s identity. Remember too that the computational
role of a symbol includes not just the symbol’s actual computational transitions but
also any possible transitions that it could undergo. A change induced by learning,
even one that does not aòect the actual processing of the symbol, is almost certain
to aòect some possible computational transition that the symbol could enter into –
perhaps by aòecting the computational roles of other symbols to which the symbol
is related by a sequence ofmerely possible computational transitions. Unless the
computational system is designed so as to minimise all computational relations
between its symbols (and what would be the point of amachine like that?), small
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changes to a computational role will percolate throughout the system, changing
symbol identities in their wake. he upshot is that Schneider’s symbol types are
unlikely to survive learning events.
Brains are learning computers. Indeed, our brains appear to learn even while we
are asleep (O’Neill et al., 2010; Warmsley and Stickgold, 2010). It seems reasonable
to suppose that computational roles inside the brain are not ûxed but are constantly
shiing, adapting to new information and trying out new strategies. In Schneider’s
account, LOT symbol types disappear across these shis. If LOT symbol types are
so unstable and ephemeral, it is hard to see how generalisations involving them
would be useful to science or philosophy.
It is worth emphasising that science needs LOT symbols that are stable across
learning events. Recent work on LOT proposes that the brain’s learning algorithms
perform probabilistic inference over LOT expressions (Piantadosi, Tenenbaum and
Goodman, 2016; Piantadosi and Jacobs, 2016). In order for these algorithms towork,
it is crucial that the identity of LOT expressions remains ûxed across changes to
their computational role so that the learner can consistently and rationally explore
a space of hypotheses. Learning algorithms need to be deûned over stable symbol
types that do not themselves change during learning. Interestingly, this work tends
to cite Feldman’s (2012) account of LOT symbol identity, which takes a semantic,
broadly referential, approach to explaining what makes two (noisy, probabilistic)
brain states of the same LOT symbol type. Schneider herself switches to a semantic
method for individuating brain stateswhen describing the computational principles
shared between diòerent humans – on her view, this is a non-computational way of
individuating brain states.
4 Concepts and Frege cases
LOT says that concepts are LOT symbols and that the semantic value of a concept
is purely referential. LOT therefore appears to have a problem with Frege cases: it
cannot distinguish between co-referring concepts, at least not on purely semantic
grounds. Fodor’s solution to this problem was to say that concepts should be
individuated by both their semantic properties and their syntactic properties (Fodor,
2008, Ch. 3). he concepts CICERO and TULLY have the same semantic content
(referent), but they are distinct concepts because they involve two diòerent LOT
symbols.
Schneider endorses the same solution to Frege cases as Fodor, but she inserts her
own theory of LOT symbol types. he result is a theory of concepts very diòerent
from what Fodor intended. Fodor called ‘pragmatism’ the claim that one’s concepts
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depend on one’s cognitive or behavioural capacities (including recognitional, clas-
siûcatory, inferential capacities). According to a pragmatist, to have the concept
DUCK is to be able to recognise ducks, classify ducks versus non-ducks, and perform
inferences about ducks. Fodor thought pragmatism was ‘the deûning catastrophe
of analytic philosophy of language and philosophy ofmind in the last half of the
twentieth century’ (Fodor, 2005, pp. 73–74). Schneider says that a LOT symbol’s
identity, and hence a concept’s identity, depends on its total computational role,
including its role in recognition, classiûcation, and inference. Schneider’s theory of
LOT symbols therefore entails Fodor’s hated pragmatism.
here is a delicious irony here, but should we accept Schneider’s theory of con-
cepts? While not disputing her arguments, I would like to strike a note of caution.
Schneider’s theorymakes her concepts just as unstable and ephemeral as her LOT
symbol types. She says that stability is provided by unvarying semantic referents.
But an agent needs stable concepts, not just stable referents. In order for an agent’s
inferences to be valid, the same concepts need to appear in her premises as in her
conclusions. his won’t happen, or at least it is unlikely to happen, on Schneider’s
view. Concepts tokened in a premisemay not be around by the time the agent is
ready to token her conclusion. If an agent were to learn just one new thing between
tokening her premises and tokening her conclusion, her inference would likely
be invalid as her concepts would likely have changed. he purpose of LOT is to
mechanise thought. Concepts need to be stable for this; they need to hang around
long enough for an agent to use them multiple times. Individuating concepts by
their total computational rolemakes concepts too unstable. It does not allow LOT
to achieve its goal.
5 Conclusion
his book throws into relief the diõculty, and importance, of the problem of indi-
viduating LOT symbols into symbol types. Contra Schneider,my instinct is to give a
semantic solution to this problem. Unlike her, I’m not worried about LOT symbols
presupposing semantic content. I think that reductive, naturalistic accounts of
semantics already facemore serious objections than a semantically inected notion
of symbols. here are also independent reasons to separate LOT from a reductive,
naturalistic theory of content. LOT may be true and useful independently of the
success or failure of such a theory. Indeed,many cognitive scientists who use LOT
do not caremuch about the success of the project of naturalising semantics at all.
Schneider’s book advances the debate on LOT. She updates the theory by integrating
considerations as diverse as neurocomputational models and neo-Russellianism
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about names. Her book wears its learning lightly, engaging the reader with simple
examples and clearlymotivated considerations. Whether or not you end up agreeing
with all its claims, I would encourage you to buy and to read it.
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